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PRIVACY REVISTED: THE DOWNFALL OF GRISWOLD
Martin R. Levy*
C. Thomas Hectus**
I. Introduction
This article presents a review of the Supreme Court's privacy
decisions since Griswold v. Connecticut,I and concentrates on Doe
v. Commonwealth's Attorney for City of Richmond2 as a vehicle to
review the Burger Court's trends in the privacy area. Doe is a good
vehicle because, though decided without opinion, the summary af-
firmance of a lower court decision denying homosexuals constitu-
tional protection resolved the tension developing between Douglas'
penumbra theory of privacy, which was the opinion of the Court in
Griswold, and the more modern substantive due process analysis.
The authors conclude that the opinions in Griswold are dead as far
as precedential value is concerned; that the privacy right is found
in the first, third, fourth, fifth, and fourteenth amendments accord-
ing to the Burger Court, and that the test for the privacy right varies
from amendment to amendment, finding its basis in the history of
the amendment to which it attaches. As far as state action is con-
cerned, all of the rights enumerated in the first, third, fourth, and
fifth amendments are applicable to the states through the four-
teenth amendment.
I. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF Doe TO THE PRIVACY DOCTRINE
In Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney for the City of Richmond,3
the Supreme Court, on March 29, 1976, summarily affirmed4 the
decision of a three-judge federal district court 5 which upheld the
constitutionality of Virginia's sodomy statute.6
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Louisville Law School. B.S., Lafayette College,
1957; M.C.H.E., University of Virginia, 1958; LL.B., University of Maryland, 1967.
** B.A. Manhattan College, 1972; J.D., University of Louisville, 1978.
1. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
2. 425 U.S. 985 (1976).
3. Id.
4. Mr. Justice Brennan, Mr. Justice Marshall, and Mr. Justice Stevens would have noted
probable jurisdiction and set the case for oral argument.
5. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney for the City of Richmond, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D.
Va. 1975).
6. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-212 (1950), as amended provided that:
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The plaintiffs in Doe sought a declaratory judgment regarding the
constitutionality of the sodomy statute, since it affected their sexual
relations with consenting adult homosexuals. They claimed that
enforcement of the statute would violate their fifth and fourteenth
amendment assurances of due process, their first amendment assur-
ance of freedom of expression, their first and ninth amendment
guarantee of privacy, and the eighth amendment prohibition of
cruel and unusual punishment.
The majority decision of the three-judge district court upheld the
state statute. The lower court held that homosexuality does not lie
within the realm of privacy protected by the recent Supreme Court
decisions which condemn state legislation "that trespasses upon the
privacy of the incidents of marriage, upon the sanctity of the home,
or upon the nurture of family life."' The court added, "[t]his and
only this concern has been the justification for nullification of State
regulation in this area."8 To buttress this interpretation of Supreme
Court action, the lower court quoted dicta from Mr. Justice Gold-
berg's concurrence in Griswold v. Connecticutv which, in turn,
quoted Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Ullman:
Adultery, homosexuality and the like are sexual intimacies which the
State forbids . . . . It is one thing when the State exerts its power to
forbid extramarital sexuality . . . but it is quite another when...
it undertakes to regulate by means of the criminal law the details of
that [marital] intimacy.'"
Noting that many states have long criminalized, and continue to
prohibit, the type of conduct described in Virginia's sodomy statute,
If any person shall carnally know in any manner any brute animal, or carnally know
any male or female person by the anus, or by or with the mouth, or voluntarily submit
to such carnal knowledge, he or she shall be guilty of a felony and shall be confined in
the penitentiary not less than one year nor more than three years.
The second portion of the statute dealt with forcible sodomy and was not relevant to the
proceedings. The relevant portion of this section has now been amended in VA. CODE ANN. §
18.2-361 (Repl. Vol. 1975). It changed the penalty provision to a class 6 felony, punishable
by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than five years; or, in the discretion of the
trier of fact, confinement in jail for not more than twelve months and a fine of not more than
one thousand dollars, either or both.
7. 403 F. Supp. at 1200.
8. Id.
9. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
10. 403 F. Supp. at 1201, citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 499 (1965).
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the district court further quoted Mr. Justice Harlan in Poe by not-
ing, "the intrusion of the whole machinery of the criminal law into
the very heart of marital privacy. . . is surely a very different thing
indeed from punishing those who establish intimacies which the law
has always forbidden ....
The promotion of morality and decency was considered by the
Court to be a matter of state legislative discretion. The burden of
proving a legitimate state interest in, or rational basis for, the stat-
ute was considered met by establishment of the mere likelihood that
the prohibited conduct was likely to contribute to moral delin-
quency. The fact that the Virginia statute had ancestry in Judaic
and Christian law and had existed to the present time supported the
state's interest and the statute's legitimacy. 2 Additionally, the
lower court cited the 1973 Supreme Court case, Wainwright v.
Stone,'3 in which a state statute similar to Virginia's sodomy statute
was upheld.
The Doe dissent by Judge Merhige offered an alternative result
based on the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. He
noted that the Supreme Court had been consistent in protecting the
individual right of personal choice in matters as private as marriage
and procreation, citing Roe v. Wade, 14 Doe v. Bolton'5 and Harlan's
concurrence in Griswold. He viewed "those cases as standing for the
principle that .every individual has a right to be free from unwar-
ranted governmental intrusion into one's decisions on private mat-
ters of intimate concern,"'" including a mature individual's choice
of an adult sexual partner in the privacy of his or her home. Without
evidence of resultant harm, that freedom of choice is one in which
the state has no legitimate interest.
Judge Merhige criticized the majority for its unwillingness to ex-
tend the marital right of privacy recognized in Griswold to homosex-
ual conduct. Griswold was a 1965 decision which invalidated a state
statute" prohibiting the use of contraceptives by married couples.
11. 367 U.S. at 553.
12. 403 F. Supp. at 1202.
13. 414 U.S. 21 (1973).
14. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
15. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
16. 403 F. Supp. at 1203 (Merhige, J., dissenting).
17. CoN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 53-32 provided that:
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At least three members of the Court in Griswold relied on Mr. Jus-
tice Harlan's dissent in the 1961 decision Poe v. Ullman, in which
Harlan objected to the majority's dismissal of an appeal for declara-
tory judgment on the constitutionality of the contraceptive prohibi-
tion statute that was later held unconstitutional in Griswold. As
applied to a married couple in their home, Harlan felt the statute
was "an intolerable and unjustifiable invasion of privacy in the
conduct of the most intimate concerns of an individual's personal
life.' 8 Although in 1961, Mr. Justice Harlan would have been un-
willing to attach the right of privacy to homosexual relationships,
language in Eisenstadt v. Baird,"5 a 1972 decision, could be inter-
preted as a decision removing the impediment of the marital-
nonmarital distinctions in private sexual acts. As the court stated
in Eisenstadt,
the marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind and
heart of its own, but an association of two individuals each with a
separate intellectual and emotional makeup. If the right of privacy
means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single,
to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to beget a
child. 20
Both Roe, a decision holding that the state's interest is not suffi-
ciently compelling during the first trimester of pregnancy to out-
weigh a woman's fundamental right to choose not to bear a con-
ceived child, and Eisenstadt, which held that unmarried persons
cannot be prohibited access to contraception methods if the state
allows access to married persons, indicated that individual personal
decisions in substantially private matters cannot be infringed upon
without a showing of the state's compelling interest.
Any person who uses any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of
preventing conception shall be fined not less than fifty dollars or imprisoned not less
than sixty days nor more than one year or be both fined and imprisoned.
Section 54-196 provided that:
Any person who assists, abets, counsels, causes, hires or commands another to com-
mit any offense may be prosecuted and punished as if he were the principal offender.
18. 367 U.S. at 539 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
19. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
20. Id. at 453 (emphasis added).
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Judge Merhige argued that no evidence had been offered by the
state which substantiated state interference in this scope of individ-
ual privacy. By process of elimination, the only justification upon
which the majority could have relied was a state interest in morality
and decency, and Stanley v. Georgia2' had, in his view, clearly dem-
onstrated that this interest does not authorize state intrusion into
the privacy of the home. In Stanley, the Supreme Court upheld the
individual right to read obscene literature in the privacy of one's
home without state interference. Judge Merhige would have in-
cluded the right to choose one's sexual partner and to practice sex-
ual acts with a consenting adult in the privacy of one's home within
that constitutionally protected zone of privacy.
The majority of the district court therefore gave a very narrow
reading to the scope of the privacy right as delineated in Griswold
and its progeny. The majority of the lower court in effect limited
privacy by adopting Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe condemning
homosexuality. The court found authority for adopting the dissent
as precedent in Goldberg's adoption of the same in his concurrence
in Griswold quoting Justice Harlan's dissenit in Poe.
It is one thing when the state exerts its power to forbid extramarital
sexuality ... or to say who may marry, but it is quite another when,
having acknowledged a marriage and the intimacies inherent in it, it
undertakes to regulate by means of the criminal law the details of
that intimacy.2"
However, as Judge Merhige noted in his Doe dissent:
To say, as the majority does, that the right of privacy, which every
citizen has, is limited to matters of marital, home or family life is
unwarranted under the law. Such a contention places a distinction
in marital-nonmarital matters which is inconsistent with current
Supreme Court opinions and is unsupportable.?
The majority opinion ignored Eisenstadt and Stanley, and chose
rather to take the more myopic view of privacy characterized by
Justice Harlan.
21. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
22. 381 U.S. at 499 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
23. 403 F. Supp. at 1203 (Merhige, J., dissenting).
19781
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The fact that the Supreme Court affirmed the majority opinion
which Judge Merhige found to be "unsupportable" under the Su-
preme Court's decisions indicates that the Burger Court has re-
jected the rationale of Griswold as enunciated by Justice Douglas,
in that there is now apparently no independent privacy right the
existence of which is a necessary consequence of other enumerated
rights. The sexual privacy right is found, in part, in the fourteenth
amendment's due process clause, and as such must be "so rooted
in the tradition and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental. '2
Oddly enough, Judge Merhige, although dissenting in Doe, also
believed the right to originate in the fourteenth amendment's due
process clause. Clearly then, the different conclusions reached by
Judge Merhige and the majority of the Supreme Court, who af-
firmed, must somehow relate to their respective positions vis a vis
Harlan's dissent in Poe. Apparently, the Supreme Court finds Har-
lan's pronouncements more acceptable than Douglas' penumbra
theory.
On appeal, plaintiffs iramed the issue to the Supreme Court as:
whether the Commonwealth of Virginia has the power to proscribe
what consenting males may do with their bodies in the privacy of the
home absent a showing by the State that the enactment has a ra-
tional basis, or since the right here involved is "fundamental" serves
a compelling state interest?2
The questions to be presented were:
(a) Were plaintiffs denied their constitutional right to privacy
previously outlined in Griswold (marital privacy based on penum-
bras from the bill of rights), Stanley (reading obscenity in one's own
home), Loving v. Virginia26 (the sanctity of the family), NAACP v.
Alabama27 (privacy in one's associations), Eisenstadt (sexual pri-
vacy in non-marital situations), and Roe (privacy in choosing to
abort) and logically extendible to privacy in sexual acts among con-
24. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
25. Brief for Appellants at 10, Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney for the City df Richmond,
425 U.S. 901 (1976).
26. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
27. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
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senting adults in the privacy of the home? These rights are funda-
mental, and as such, the state must meet the compelling interest
test. Plaintiffs argued that Virginia had not met its burden of proof
in this case, and neither the district court's reference to longevity
of the statute nor its biblical ancestry relieves the state's burden.
(b) Were plaintiffs denied due process and equal protection of
the laws? The substantive due process argument was that the stat-
ute did not distinguish between public and private acts, and thus
the state had not chosen the least intrusive manner while invading
a fundamental right.
(c) Since the Supreme Court had recognized the right of privacy
in the relationships of married couples and unmarried heterosexual
couples, were not homosexual couples denied equal protection of the
laws without a state showing of compelling interest in denying their
relationship the same right? Plaintiffs argued they were.
(d) Was plaintiffs' first amendment guarantee of freedom of
expression also infringed? By enforcement of the statute, plaintiffs
argued, the right to satisfy their intellectual and emotional needs
in the privacy of their own home as guaranteed by Stanley was
denied.
The Commonwealth of Virginia asked for dismissal for want of a
substantial federal question. The appellants' arguments were met
as follows:
(a) The right of privacy inherent in the marital relationship
recognized in Griswold cannot justifiably be extended to include
homosexual relationships and the sodomic acts privately committed
within those relationships.
(b) Since no right of privacy in homosexual relationships exists,
and as Stanley was merely a first amendment case and enforcement
of the Georgia statute in one's home would have limited specific first
amendment rights, there is no compulsion for the state to seek the
least detrimental alternative to proscribing private consensual hom-
osexual acts in order to afford plaintiffs due process of law.
(c) The statute does not discriminate between married and
unmarried couples, nor has the Supreme Court decreed that mar-
ried persons have a right to commit sodomy by reason of their mari-
tal relationship, thus there is no equal protection problem.
1978]
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(d) The intent of the framers of the first amendment was to
protect expression of ideas, not conduct.
Additionally, the State relied on previous Supreme Court rejec-
tion of appeals in Pruett v. Texas18 and Canfield v. Oklahoma.2 9 The
lower court in Pruett upheld the state sodomy statute, rejecting the
claim that private consensual acts of sodomy are encompassed in
the right of privacy. Canfield also upheld a sodomy statute, reject-
ing the argument that consenting adults have a fifth and fourteenth
amendment right to engage in sexual activity.
Although summary affirmance of the lower court's decision by the
Supreme Court indicates an adoption of the conclusions, but not
necessarily the rationale of the district court, as aforementioned, the
affirmance in conjunction with the cases noted hereinafter, would
appear to support the proposition that presently the privacy right
is not a unitary right derived from the penumbras of the Bill of
Rights (Justice Douglas' Griswold opinion). Rather, the right is ei-
ther attendant upon the protection of certain fundamental, enumer-
ated rights in the Bill of Rights, or is to be found in the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. It seems that Justice Gold-
berg's concurrence most accurately reflects the reasoning, but not
the holdings, of the state of privacy law today. He accepted Justice
Harlan's pronouncements in Poe as to the ambit of the right, but
found the origin of the right, in part, in the ninth amendment,
rather than the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Even that difference is minimized, though, since the test applied to
the ninth amendment by Goldberg is substantially the same test
applied to the due process clause, i.e., whether the particular right
is so rooted in the traditions and conscience of the people as to be
fundamental.
Following is a review of the post-Griswold cases relating to the
expansion of the right of privacy. Admittedly some are ostensibly"equal protection" cases (Eisenstadt) or first amendment cases
(Stanley).
28. 402 U.S. 902 (1971).
29. 414 U.S. 991 (1973).
[Vol. 12:627
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HI. THE IMPORT OF EISENSTADT
If Eisenstadt v. Baird established a right of sexual privacy for the
individual, how can the state constitutionally criminalize homosex-
ual conduct in private? Apparently Eisenstadt established no such
right of "sexual privacy," just as Griswold established no broad
ranging right of privacy. This narrow reading of Griswold compels
the narrow reading of Eisenstadt.
In Eisenstadt v. Baird, Baird had been arrested following an ad-
dress at Boston University, at the conclusion of which he had given
a package of Emko foam, a contraceptive, to a young woman. Baird
was convicted under a Massachusetts law3" prohibiting the dispens-
ing of contraceptives, except by doctors or pharmacists, pursuant to
a doctor's prescription, and then only to married women.
Baird's petition for habeas corpus was granted by the First Cir-
cuit 3' Court of Appeals on the grounds that the state had interfered
with "fundamental" human rights under Griswold. The Supreme
Court affirmed.32
30. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 21 (West) provided that:
Except as provided in section twenty-one A, whoever sells, lends, gives away, exhib-
its or offers to sell, lend or give away an instrument or other article intended to be used
for self-abuse, or any drug, medicine, instrument or article whatever for the prevention
of conception or for causing unlawful abortion, or advertises the same, or writes, prints,
or causes to be written or printed a card, circular, book, pamphlet, advertisement or
notice of any kind stating when, where, how, of whom or by what means such article
can be purchased or obtained, or manufactures or makes any such article shall be
punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than five years or in jail or
the house of correction for not more than two and one half years or by a fine of not
less than one hundred nor more than one thousand dollars.
Section 21A provided that:
A registered physician may administer to or prescribe for any married person drugs
or articles intended for the prevention of pregnancy or conception. A registered phar-
macist actually engaged in the business of pharmacy may furnish such drugs or articles
to any married person presenting a prescription from a registered physician. A public
health agency, a registered nurse, or a maternity health clinic operated by or in an
accredited hospital may furnish information to any married person as to where profes-
sional advice regarding such drugs or articles may be lawfully obtained. This section
shall not be construed as affecting the provisions of sections twenty and twenty-one
relative to prohibition of advertising of drugs or articles intended for the prevention of
pregnancy or conception; nor shall this section be construed so as to permit the sale
or dispensing of such drugs or articles by means of any vending machine or similar
device.
31. 429 F.2d 1398 (1st Cir. 1970).
32. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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Two interests were involved in invalidating the statute: first, the
right of privacy under Griswold, and second, the equal protection
of the laws. The Court took the view that "[if there is need to have
a physician prescribe (and a pharmacist dispense) contraceptives,
that need is as great for unmarried persons as for married persons.""3
If, on the other hand, the statute merely regulated morals by
deterring illegal intercourse, it was underinclusive in that married
women, to whom contraceptives were available, would not be de-
terred from extra-marital intercourse. 4 Nor would the court accept
deterrence of premarital intercourse as the purpose of the law,35
finding that the birth of an unwanted child was unreasonable pun-
ishment for fornication. Whether a health measure or a morals mea-
sure, then, the statute fell on equal protection grounds.
The court held only that the state could not discriminate in the
prohibition of availability of contraceptives. It did not hold that a
state was constitutionally precluded from a prohibition on the dis-
tribution of contraceptives. While Griswold held that a state may
not criminally prohibit the use of contraceptives due to the intrusion
on the fundamental right of privacy, the holding did not establish
a constitutional right of access.
The court could have simply decided Eisenstadt on equal protec-
tion grounds. The court did note in Eisenstadt, however, that if
Griswold did stand for the proposition that a state could not ban
distribution to married couples due to the right of privacy, then
neither could it ban distribution to the unmarried, for "[i]f the
right to privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intru-
sion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child."36
Most commentators recognize that Eisenstadt was not a privacy
decision. A fairly typical example is one comment noting that
Eisenstadt was decided on equal protection grounds, and that the
33. Id. at 450.
34. Id. at 449.
35. Id. at 448.
36. Id. at 453.
37. Comment, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 3 N.Y.U. REV. L. AND SOC. CHANGE 65 [hereinafter cited
as Comment].
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court's use of the "rational basis" test on the statute implied that
there was no "fundamental right" of privacy involved. The author
did note, however, that while not rising to a fundamental right, the
right of privacy was accorded more attention and thus deserving of
more protection than other "non-fundamental" rights. The author
based this assumption on the following reasoning: first, the court,
in the majority opinion, expressed it's disbelief in the stated purpose
of the law, when ordinarily it would not look beyond the stated
purpose of the statute under the mere "rationality" test; second, the
Supreme Court does not ordinarily strike down under-inclusive stat-
utes; third, normally under the "rationality" test, any conceivable
purpose will support the validity of the act; finally, invalidating a
statute under the reasonableness standard is distinctive in itself
(prior to Eisenstadt, only two other statutes were struck down under
the test").
Was the court adopting a more stringent standard of review, by
actively testing the reasonableness of the legislation? Or, was the
court using a "sliding scale" approach, balancing the state interest
according to the importance of a protected, though "non-
fundamental," right?
No matter what approach was ultimately used by the Court, it
was recognized that the success of attempts to use Eisenstadt to
effect change in laws impinging on individual privacy "remains un-
certain, for the Court's treatment of the privacy issue established
only a shaky foundation for future litigation in this area."39 Doe
clearly tells us that Eisenstadt did not give use to a promise of
sexual freedom but rather was a narrow decision limited to the
individuals right to determine procreation similar to Roe v. Wade.
In Roe the Supreme Court "recognized that a right of personal
privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does
exist under the Constitution . . [O]nly personal rights that can
be deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered lib-
38. In Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), the Supreme Court struck down an Idaho statute
which gave males preference over females as administrators of estates. In Morey v. Doud, 354
U.S. 457 (1957), the Court affirmed a lower court holding which had struck down a state law
that excepted the American Express Company from a state law requiring firms that issued
money orders in the state to secure a license.
39. Comment, supra note 37, at 69.
1978]
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erty',"10 are included in this privacy guarantee. Decisions have dem-
onstrated that the right extends to activities involving marriage,
procreation, contraception, family relationships and child rearing
and education. The source of the guarantee is the fourteenth
amendment's protection of individual liberty, from state intrusion,
contained in the due process clause." However, the right of privacy
does not give one a license to use his body as he pleases; if the state
can show a compelling interest, intrusion into that privacy may be
justified."
The Supreme Court held that the Texas statute3 unconstitu-
tionally violated a pregnant woman's fundamental right to choose
to abort her child during the first trimester of pregnancy, when the
state could not substantiate a compelling interest, either in the
health of the mother or in the potential life of the fetus.
If Roe is to be read as a personal autonomy decision, should not
the choice to commit a homosexual act be deemed as fundamental
as the choice to bear a child? It seems the state interest in Roe was
substantially more compelling than any conceivable state interest
in Doe, since in Roe the state had the duty to represent the interests
of an unborn child. No such compelling interest is present in a
homosexual relationship between consenting adults. Could not the
Court in Doe have applied a balancing approach, finding that the
state interest, if it be for preservation of moral decency, does not
become sufficiently compelling until the prohibited acts are com-
mitted in areas where the participants have no reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy?
The formula for determining rights protected by the due process
of law defines protected liberties as those "so rooted in the traditions
and conscience of our people as to be ranked fundamental."" It
seems apparent that the Supreme Court has determined that the
ancient and common law, and the customs and attitude of modern
society will not condone the envelopment of homosexual relation-
ships in the sphere of "family relationships." Until the conscious-
40. 410 U.S. at 152.
41. Id. at 153.
42. Id. at 154.
43. Articles 1191-1194 and 1196 of the Texas Penal Code.
44. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 493.
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ness of the people is willing to attach that status to homosexuality,
no right of privacy inheres in homosexual relationships.
IV. THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The first amendment problem presented by the summary affirm-
ance in Doe is, why the privacy of the home established in Stanley
v. Georgia does not protect homosexual conduct between consenting
adults conducted in the privacy of one's home. An examination of
Stanley reveals that the privacy of Stanley is attendant upon the
exercise of a first amendment right; no substantive right of privacy
within the home was established.
The facts in Stanley were as follows. Pursuant to a warrant, fed-
eral and state agents conducted a search of Stanley's home for evi-
dence of bookmaking activities. Although the search for such was
fruitless, three reels of obscene film were found. Stanley was con-
victed for possessing obscene material under a Georgia statute." On
appeal, Stanley argued that the first and fourteenth amendments
prohibit the punishment of mere private possession of obscene ma-
terial. The Supreme Court agreed.
Was Stanley a privacy decision in the vein of Griswold, or was it
merely a first amendment decision upholding the right to receive
information? There were two complimentary interests favorable to
Stanley, perhaps either of which could have supported his asserted
right to read or look at whatever he wished.
In an attempt to frame the decision within the ambit of the first
amendment, the Court noted the constitutional freedom of speech"necessarily protects the right to receive"46 information and ideas,
regardless of their social worth.7 "Nor is it relevant that obscene
materials . . . [are] arguably devoid of any idealogical content.
The line between the transmission of ideas and mere entertainment
is much too elusive for this Court to draw, if indeed such a line can
be drawn at all."4 Note, however, that commercial distribution is
is not protected."
45. GA. CODE ANN. § 26-6301 (Supp. 1968).
46. 394 U.S. at 564.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 566.
49. See United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971); United States v. Thirty-Seven Photo-
19781 639
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The predominant factor distinguishing Stanley from Roth v.
United States" and its progeny, then, is the element of privacy. As
the Court stated in Stanley:
[Wlhatever may be the justification for the statutes regulating ob-
scenity, we do not think they reach into the privacy of one's own
home. If the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State
has no business telling a man sitting alone in his own house what
books he may read or what films he may watch.5'
This element of privacy is "fundamental;" any intrusion then
should require a compelling interest. The conduct which the plain-
tiffs in Doe sought to protect had a sufficient non-speech element
to enable the state to regulate that conduct without a showing of a
compelling interest. The conduct involved here is not "symbolic
speech" invoking the opportunity for free political discussion.
In United States v. O'Brien,52 the Supreme Court discussed the
applicability of first amendment protection claimed by a draft card
burner. The court stated, "[w]e cannot accept the view that an
apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled 'speech'
whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to
express an idea."53 Even assuming, arguendo, that homosexual con-
duct, that is, sexual activity is "speech," it does not necessarily
follow that the conduct is protected. When speech and nonspeech
elements are combined, "[a] sufficiently important governmental
interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental
limitations on First Amendment freedoms. 54
Nor does the associational right implicit in the first amendment
protect homosexual activity, for that right protects association for
the purpose of speech. In NAACP v. Alabama,55 the Supreme Court
reversed the NAACP's contempt citation for its refusal to surrender
its membership lists to the state of Alabama. In upholding the right
of the NAACP to resist disclosure, the Court noted that it had more
graphs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971).
50. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
51. 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) (emphasis added).
52. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
53. Id. at 376.
54. Id.
55. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
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than recognized the close nexus between the freedom of speech and
assembly:
It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the
advancement of beliefs and ideas is an unseparable aspect of the
"liberty" assured by the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech. . .. Of course, it
is immaterial whether the beliefs sought to be advanced by associa-
tion pertain to political, economic, religious, or cultural matters, and
state action which may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to
associate as subject to the closest scrutiny."
It follows that homosexuals' first amendment right of association
for speech purposes are recognized. In Gay Students Organization
of the University of New Hampshire v. Bonner7 the First Circuit
Court of Appeals precluded the University of New Hampshire from
denying the gay students organization the use of campus facilities
for certain activities. Homosexual acts are not, however, constitu-
tionally protected.
V. SYNTHESIS
The Supreme Court's latest summary of constitutionally pro-
tected rights of privacy was contained in Paul v. Davis." Davis had
been charged with shoplifting. Although the charges were later dis-
missed, Davis' name and photograph were included in a flyer, sent
throughout the community, listing "active shoplifters." He brought
a Section 1983 civil rights action against the area police chiefs who
had distributed the flyer. One of the plaintiff's arguments was that
he had been deprived of his constitutional right to privacy. The
Court dismissed this claim because the plaintiff failed to allege any
governmental intrusion into a sphere of constitutionally protected
privacy. Contained in the opinion was an enumeration of the Court-
recognized areas of constitutional privacy.
The Court noted that no specific right to privacy is guaranteed
by any provision of the Constitution. However,
56. Id. at 460 (citations omitted).
57. 509 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1974).
58. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
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(a) certain "zones of privacy" act to limit governmental intru-
sion upon specific constitutional guarantees including the privacy
which limits unreasonable searches and seizures," and
(b) some substantive rights of privacy are "fundamental" or
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" and guaranteed by the
fourteenth amendment. Those include marriage, procreation, con-
traception, family relationships, child rearing and education.
Using this analysis, Doe was correctly decided. Homosexual acts
have historically never been equated with procreation and contra-
ception, marriage, family relationships and child rearing so as to be
classified as "fundamental" or "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty." Thus homosexual acts do not qualify for protection af-
forded by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
What then, is the right of privacy? It is the authors' view that, in
addition to the fourteenth amendment privacy, specific guarantees
are found in the first, third, fourth and fifth amendments, using the
test set forth in Justice Goldberg's concurrence in Griswold. The
test for each of those amendments derived from the history from
which it was born.
A. The First Amendment Test
Stanley v. Georgia can be viewed as a first amendment privacy
decision. From this language in Stanley:
[W]e think that mere categorization of these films as 'obscene' is
insufficient justification for such a drastic invasion of personal liber-
ties guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. What-
ever may be the justifications for other statutes regulating obscenity,
we do not think they reach into the privacy of one's own home. If the
First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no busi-
ness telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may
read or what films he may watch. Our whole constitutional heritage
rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control men's
minds.6
it is clear that a zone of privacy, the home, is essential to ensure the
59. Id. at 713.
60. 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969).
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protection of the thought processes of one's own mind inherent in
the first amendment freedoms of religion, speech and association.
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton1 aligned Stanley with the four-
teenth amendment substantive due process privacy rights, citing
Roe as authority for this analysis. The owners and managers of Paris
Theatres exhibited obscene films, described as hard core pornogra-
phy, in two adult movie theaters. The Supreme Court held that
obscenity was not protected by the first amendment; the state,
therefore, could prohibit the showing of obscene material since the
state has legitimate interests in regulating the morals of its citi-
zenry. The theaters attempted to assert the constitutional privacy
rights of its patrons, but the Court refused to equate a public theater
with a private, home. In the Court's words "[n]othing, however, in
in this Court's decisions intimates that there is any 'fundamental'
privacy right 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' to watch
obscene movies in places of public accommodation.""2 This sounds
like a fourteenth amendment substantive due process test. Roe,
however, specifically attributes the privacy recognized in Stanley to
the first amendment.
The privacy in the home recognized in Stanley is a limited pri-
vacy; it is the right to possess and read books of one's own choosing
in the privacy of one's own home. No one would argue that when
the conduct regulated by the state is conduct which is not constitu-
tionally protected, the privacy of the home would shelter commis-
sion of state prohibited acts. Murder of a spouse in the confines of
the home would add no legitimacy to the act. Stanley privacy must
be read narrowly to emanate from a first amendment right.
B. The Fourth Amendment Test
The privacy right founded in the fourth amendment is popularly
described as one protecting people, not places. That language is
contained in Katz v. United States13 a fourth amendment case
which followed Griswold by two years, but preceded Stanley, Roe
and Doe. In Katz, the defendant was charged with transmitting
wagering data by telephone. The evidence had been gathered by an
61. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
62. Id. at 66.
63. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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FBI-planted electronic listening and recording device attached to
the exterior of a public telephone booth which the defendant had
used to place his calls. The Court described the privacy right af-
forded by the fourth amendment:
[Tihe Fourth Amendment cannot be translated into a general con-
stitutional "right to privacy." That Amendment protects individual
privacy against certain kinds of governmental intrusion, but its pro-
tections go further, and often have nothing to do with privacy at all.
Other provisions of the Constitution protect personal privacy from
other forms of governmental invasion. But the protection of a person's
general right to privacy-his right to be let alone by other people-is,
like the protection of his property and of his very life, left largely to
the law of the individual States."
The Court listed other constitutional protections of personal pri-
vacy: the first amendment limitation on abridgement of freedom to
associate and privacy in one's associations, the third amendment
prohibition against unconsented peacetime quartering of soldiers,
the fifth amendment interest in securing to the individual a private
life. Since "[v]irtually every governmental action interferes with
personal privacy to some degree, "the question in each case is
whether that interference violates a command of the United States
Constitution." 5 The Court concluded that government intrusion
into areas where individuals have reasonable expectations of pri-
vacy violated the fourth amendment protection against unreasona-
ble searches and seizures. So, as with the first amendment grant of
privacy, the fourth amendment privacy right is limited. It can be
infringed by the state acting upon a reasonable set of circumstances.
C. The Fifth Amendment Test
The privilege against self-incrimination offers another protec-
tion-the right of each individual to be let alone.6" One of its pur-
poses is to prevent state control through coercion of the mind and
free will of an accused person, so that he has a choice whether to
assist the state in his own conviction." The privilege is fulfilled only
64. Id. at 350-51 (footnotes omitted).
65. Id. at 350, n.5.
66. Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966).
67. In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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when a person is guaranteed the right to remain silent unless he
chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will. 68
D. Goldberg's Concurrence in Griswold and the Ninth
Amendment
Justice Goldberg set out the ninth amendment test for fundamen-
tal rights in his concurring opinion in Griswold:
[L]ook to the traditions and [collective] conscience of our people
to determine whether a principle is so rooted [there] . . .as to be
ranked as fundamental . . . . [T]he inquiry is whether a right in-
volved "is of such a character that it cannot be denied without violat-
ing those 'fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at
the base of all our civil and political institutions.'69
The right of privacy in the marital relationship meets this test as a
fundamental personal right, a right not expressly enumerated in the
first eight amendments but included in the reservoir of unenumer-
ated, retained fundamental rights of the people.
This test is similar to the Court's test for substantive due process
under the fourteenth amendment. Because this concurrence was
necessary to the majority to carry Griswold it deserves mention; the
ninth amendment privacy right, however, seems short lived after
the Court's discussion of privacy in Roe. In Roe, the Court disa-
vowed the ninth amendment test"' and opted for substantive due
process as the repository of the procreation privacy right. This is
particularly surprising since the Court in Griswold particularly disa-
vowed substantive due process. 1
E. Douglas' Penumbra Theory in Griswold
In the majority decision in Griswold, Justice Douglas disavowed
the substantive due process approach and held that there was a
unitary right of privacy emanating as a penumbra from the bill of
rights. Now that the Court has held that privacy involving procrea-
tion is found in the fourteenth amendment on a substantive due
68. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
69. 381 U.S. at 493.
70. 410 U.S. 113, 153.
71. 381 U.S. 479, 481-82 (1965).
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process theory all of the Griswold decision is lost as far as preceden-
tial value is concerned.
CONCLUSION
Recent Supreme Court decisions on the issue of privacy have
eroded the precedential value of the opinion in Griswold. Privacy
dealing with marriage and procreation are now to be argued under
the fourteenth amendment on the theory of substantive due process.
Nonetheless, the first, third, fourth and fifth amendments have
privacy emanations which each apply a different test based on the
theory under which the amendment was born.
Thus, privacy rights are to be found in the first, third, fourth,
fifth, and fourteenth amendments. The advocate must be careful to
distinguish the criteria for privacy under each of these amendments
as they differ depending on the historical basis for the particular
amendment.
